Quantum Policy That Actually Strengthens U.S. Defense

A quarter-million quantum jobs by 2030 sounds like a national success story. It’s also a warning flare. If the United States can’t translate quantum research into manufacturing capacity, secure supply chains, and cleared talent, the “quantum economy” turns into a headline—while adversaries turn it into capability.

This is where the AI in Government & Public Sector conversation gets real. AI systems in defense and critical infrastructure depend on trusted compute, resilient communications, and secure data. Quantum technologies touch all three—especially in cybersecurity (post-quantum cryptography), sensing, and future high-end computing. The hard part isn’t the physics. It’s the policy.

What follows is a practical, defense-oriented way to read the current U.S. quantum moment: what’s working, what’s failing, and what government leaders, primes, and dual-use startups should do next.

Quantum matters for defense because it’s not “one technology”

Quantum is often treated like a single bet: “quantum computers will break encryption.” That framing is too narrow and, frankly, unhelpful for decision-makers.

The defense relevance is broader and nearer-term:

• Post-quantum cryptography (PQC): The migration problem is here now. Classified and sensitive-but-unclassified systems have long refresh cycles, and “harvest now, decrypt later” is a rational adversary strategy.
• Quantum sensing and timing: Navigation and sensing resilience matter when GPS is jammed, spoofed, or denied. Quantum-enhanced sensing is not science fiction; it’s a pathway to better inertial navigation, magnetic anomaly detection, and precision timing.
• Quantum compute (eventually): Useful quantum computing is still constrained, but policy decisions made now determine whether future capability is domestic, allied, or offshore.

Here’s the thing about defense tech: capability arrives as a package—hardware, software, operators, logistics, compliance, and training. Quantum is no different. If the U.S. wants quantum to strengthen national security (and support next-generation AI), policy has to target the whole package.

Export controls: clarity beats cleverness

Export controls are supposed to prevent adversaries from gaining access to sensitive capability. When they’re vague, they produce the worst of both worlds: friendly collaboration slows down, while determined adversaries route around the rule.

The U.S. imposed export controls on advanced quantum computing systems in 2024 using technical thresholds (like qubit counts and coherence metrics). That approach makes sense on paper. In practice, it creates three predictable problems:

1) Over-compliance by responsible firms

When rules are ambiguous, general counsel gets cautious. Companies end up restricting legitimate work with allied universities and partners because they can’t confidently interpret what’s controlled.

In defense-adjacent quantum R&D, that caution has a cost: fewer co-development projects, slower iteration, and less interoperability with partners who will ultimately be part of coalition operations.

2) Under-compliance by aggressive actors

Other firms interpret ambiguity permissively—especially if enforcement is perceived as under-resourced technically. That’s not hypothetical. Quantum performance metrics evolve fast, and enforcement requires staff who can translate technical nuance into compliance decisions.

3) A weird talent incentive

One especially sharp point from the policy debate: reporting requirements tied to new hires can inadvertently incentivize firms to freeze recruiting pipelines while ignoring existing access patterns.

What works better:

• Bright-line definitions of controlled categories that are updated on a schedule (think: quarterly or semiannual technical refresh).
• Clear treatment of cloud access and remote collaboration—because “export” increasingly means “access,” not “shipment.”
• Allied alignment so companies aren’t forced into awkward choices between U.S. compliance and coalition R&D.

If you want a quotable standard: export controls should be legible to engineers and enforceable by regulators. If they aren’t, they’ll fail at speed.

Investment screening: fast for allies, closed for adversaries

Quantum startups don’t die because their science fails. They die because their funding timelines don’t match their burn rates.

That’s why investment screening—especially through processes like CFIUS—can unintentionally become an anti-innovation tool. Long, uncertain reviews discourage capital, including from allied sovereign wealth funds and institutional investors.

At the same time, adversaries don’t need control to extract value. Minority stakes, licensing deals, and third-country intermediaries can all function as technology-transfer channels.

A strong national approach is not “screen everything equally.” It’s differentiation.

A policy stance that fits the threat model

A pragmatic model looks like this:

1. Expedited review lanes for trusted allies (for example: Five Eyes, EU partners, Japan, South Korea) with objective standards and time limits (e.g., 30 days).
2. Categorical restrictions for investment from Chinese-affiliated or state-linked entities into quantum companies working on sensitive capability.
3. Time-bounded mitigation requirements instead of open-ended compliance burdens that small companies can’t staff.
4. Expanded attention to non-equity pathways (licensing, joint development, data access) that can transfer value without triggering obvious thresholds.

This is one of those moments where being “nice” is not being strategic. If you don’t separate allies from adversaries, you punish the wrong group and still miss the real risks.

The National Quantum Initiative needs a defense-first update

The U.S. has had a quantum strategy since 2018, and it benefited from real momentum: basic research strength, university output, and growing private investment. But national strategies expire faster than technology cycles. Reauthorization and modernization matter.

From a defense and public-sector AI perspective, three elements should be explicit:

1) PQC migration as a program, not a memo

Legislation introduced in the 119th Congress directing a DoD-led post-quantum cryptography migration strategy is the right direction.

But “strategy” isn’t enough. Migration requires:

• System inventory (where cryptography lives across IT, embedded, weapons, and industrial control)
• Prioritization (what’s most exposed to long-term compromise)
• Testing and accreditation pipelines that don’t take longer than the threat timeline
• Vendor requirements for post-quantum readiness, especially for government contractors

If you run a government program office or security team, the actionable move is straightforward: treat PQC like a multi-year modernization portfolio, not a compliance checkbox.

2) Manufacturing and supply chain policy that admits constraints

Recent industrial policy has taught a blunt lesson: subsidizing demand while ignoring permitting, workforce, and environmental review timelines can stall projects.

Quantum manufacturing will have similar choke points—specialized materials, cryogenics, photonics, fabrication tools, and skilled technicians. If policy “juices demand” without easing the constraints, you’ll end up with announcements and no throughput.

3) Testbeds that connect labs to operators

Defense programs need repeatable test environments where prototypes can be evaluated against operational constraints: size, weight, power, reliability, maintainability, and cyber risk.

A defense-focused quantum testbed—paired with procurement pathways that don’t require a five-year bureaucratic pilgrimage—would accelerate what the Pentagon actually needs: validated capability.

States are building quantum hubs—DoD should treat them as strategic terrain

Two state examples illustrate the trend:

• New Mexico is organizing national labs, universities, and private sector partnerships under a DARPA-backed quantum framework.
• Maryland is pushing a “Capital of Quantum” initiative designed to attract more than $1 billion in investment.

If you’re a federal leader, don’t view these as local economic stories. View them as strategic infrastructure—like shipyards, depots, and aerospace corridors.

What government buyers can do now

• Anchor these hubs with mission-driven demand signals (sensing, timing, PQC tooling, secure cloud access models).
• Use regional procurement pilots to shorten feedback loops between operators and builders.
• Pair grants with targeted regulatory waivers where legally feasible to reduce project delays.

The federal government doesn’t have to own everything, but it does need to coordinate. Quantum is moving into the phase where geography and supply chains matter again.

Workforce is the bottleneck—and it’s not just PhDs

The quantum industry projects 250,000 jobs by 2030. Meanwhile, job postings were up only 4.4% year-over-year as of April 2025, with a 13.9% month-over-month decline—a signal that demand planning and training capacity aren’t aligned.

The most useful workforce insight is also the most ignored:

Over 50% of quantum jobs don’t require advanced degrees.

That should reshape how government and primes build pipelines. Quantum manufacturing and deployment needs technicians, test engineers, field service teams, and quality specialists.

What a defense-ready quantum workforce pipeline looks like

• Community college and certificate tracks for cryogenic systems, photonics assembly, RF testing, precision metrology, and cleanroom operations
• Apprenticeships co-designed with primes and dual-use startups
• Security clearance planning early in hiring pipelines (don’t wait until someone is mission-critical)
• Cross-training with AI and autonomy: data workflows, model validation, and secure MLOps increasingly overlap with quantum-adjacent programs

There’s also a hard national security reality: a large share of U.S. quantum-relevant PhDs go to foreign nationals, with a significant portion from China. The answer isn’t blanket exclusion. It’s smarter access control, clearer reporting rules, and building a deeper domestic bench so programs aren’t hostage to a narrow talent pool.

What this means for leaders running AI in the public sector

AI programs in government often focus on software: models, data, governance, and responsible use. That’s necessary—but incomplete.

Quantum policy is a forcing function that pushes public-sector AI leaders to think end-to-end: hardware trust, cyber timelines, industrial capacity, and coalition interoperability.

If you’re shaping strategy in defense, homeland security, or critical infrastructure, here are four concrete next steps I’d prioritize:

1. Start PQC migration planning now—inventory systems, define priorities, and require PQC readiness from vendors.
2. Demand clearer export-control guidance from relevant agencies so allied R&D and procurement aren’t slowed by ambiguity.
3. Build an “ally-fast / adversary-closed” investment posture so capital flows to domestic scaling rather than regulatory limbo.
4. Fund workforce programs that create technicians, not just researchers—because factories and fielding timelines are decided by the middle of the skills pyramid.

The U.S. can make quantum an American jobs story, but it won’t happen automatically. It happens when policy is engineered with the same discipline we expect from national security systems: clear requirements, measurable outcomes, and continuous updates.

The forward-looking question worth sitting with is simple: when quantum capability becomes operationally relevant at scale, will the United States be the manufacturer and integrator—or just the early inventor?